A Second Passport and a Price Not Listed on the Transfer Market
Core answer: Maarten Paes và Ole Romeny đủ điều kiện khoác áo đội tuyển Indonesia vì đã vượt qua hai cửa: Luật Quốc tịch Indonesia số 12/2006 (Điều 20, được Hạ viện phê chuẩn) và tiêu chí "mối liên hệ đáng kể" của FIFA dựa trên nơi sinh của ông bà. Tiêu chí này không đòi hỏi dòng máu bản địa. Key facts: - Maarten Paes (thủ môn, sinh năm 1998) được FIFA phê duyệt chuyển liên đoàn vào tháng 8 năm 2024. - Ole Romeny (tiền đạo) tuyên thệ nhập tịch Indonesia vào tháng 2 năm 2025. - FIFA cho phép đại diện liên đoàn nơi cha mẹ ruột hoặc ông bà ruột sinh ra. - Không có phí chuyển nhượng; chi phí thực là hành chính, pháp lý và chính trị. - Nguồn cung kiều bào gốc "blijvers" là hữu hạn và không thể tái tạo. Source attribution: Kompas (Indonesia) | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn Related Q&A: Q: Vì sao tiêu chí nơi sinh của ông bà không phải là "lỗ hổng pháp lý"? A: Đây là tiêu chí được FIFA thiết kế có chủ đích, không phải kẽ hở bị lợi dụng. Q: Vì sao động thái này ảnh hưởng đến Việt Nam? A: Đây là mối đe dọa trực tiếp đến vị thế khu vực của Việt Nam, theo Chỉ số Chiều sâu Đội hình của VangBong.vn. Q: Rủi ro lớn nhất của chiến lược nhập tịch là gì? A: Rủi ro danh tiếng khi bị gọi là "lỗ hổng", cùng nguồn cung kiều bào hữu hạn theo thời gian.
In August 2026, in a corridor nobody noticed at the Indonesian football federation's headquarters, a file was closed. Inside it was a faded birth certificate, recording the birthplace of a grandfather on land once called the Dutch East Indies. No fan at Gelora Bung Karno saw that paper, no camera filmed it. And yet it — not a shot, not a save, not a goal — was what opened the door for goalkeeper Maarten Paes to wear Indonesia's national shirt.
Around the same time, in another office, a striker named Ole Romeny read an oath. In February 2026, he became an Indonesian citizen. Two people, two positions: a goalkeeper and a centre-forward. Two doors opened by paperwork, not by goals.
I have sat on enough Southeast Asian stands to know that the moments that decide a team's fate rarely happen in front of a lens. A forgotten contract, and one day it changes the wind of a whole season. This time, that contract was a single legal clause.
Indonesia is the story of a nation of more than 270 million people, where football is the second religion right after the official one, and yet has never once reached a World Cup in its modern form. In the shared memory of Southeast Asian fans, Indonesia is a team capable of making a stadium shake but never durable enough to last a qualifying campaign. They once appeared at the 2026 World Cup under the name Dutch East Indies — their only World Cup — a milestone most viewers today no longer remember.
The 2026 World Cup qualifiers opened the door wider for Asia. It is the moment when a place at the finals is no longer a pipe dream for Southeast Asian teams, and also the moment when every nation in the region realises the window of opportunity does not stay open forever. Indonesia's football federation, PSSI, chose a path that does not run through the academy.
That path begins with history. For centuries, the Dutch East Indies was home to a community of European descent — Dutch settlers who stayed long-term, across generations, known in Dutch as "blijvers", meaning "those who stayed". After Indonesian independence, most of them emigrated to the Netherlands, carrying with them bloodlines and papers that recorded their birthplace on this archipelago. Decades later, their descendants grew up in Europe, hold Dutch nationality, and — for some of them — play professional football in top European leagues.
That is the treasure Indonesia found. A treasure lying in colonial-era civil registers, not on the training pitch.
Indonesian Citizenship Law No. 12 of 2026, at Article 20, allows naturalisation on grounds of national interest, subject to approval by the House of Representatives (DPR). This is the legal route PSSI used to turn Dutch-descended players into Indonesian citizens. In parallel, at the football level, FIFA has its own rulebook — the Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes (RGAS) — setting a "substantial connection" criterion, under which a person may represent a federation if a biological parent or grandparent was born on that federation's territory.
Two legal systems, two doors. Paes and Romeny had to walk through both.
The first striking thing is the position. Goalkeeper and centre-forward are the two roles with the greatest leverage on the pitch. A top goalkeeper can steady an entire back line that rarely plays together at national-team level, where camp time is short and understanding is a luxury. A centre-forward of real quality can turn a single moment into a goal — the very thing Southeast Asian teams most lack in balanced games.
When a federation goes naturalising, it is usually drawn to flashy names on the flanks, where the pretty moves are born. Indonesia chose differently: it reinforced the spine. That is a technical choice rather than a showbiz one, and it says that the planners at PSSI — even if they are not the ones on the bench — understand that the strength of a weak national team lies in limiting damage before thinking about scoring.
In the sessions where I sat on the stands watching Indonesia's World Cup qualifiers, what stood out was not the beautiful attacking play but the hesitation at decisive moments: an uncertain back-pass, a goalkeeper's foray that made the whole defence hold its breath. That is the kind of problem an elite goalkeeper can cover. And that is why Paes, in pure football logic, was the most valuable piece in this batch of naturalisations.
At the same time, Romeny — a centre-forward — represents what Indonesia has never had enough of: a finisher. Southeast Asian teams often play well in midfield, create chances, then fail to finish. Chances are burned, and one careless moment in the 85th minute decides the game.
What matters is that neither of these doors requires indigenous blood. This is the point that Indonesian and regional media often bundle together and call a "legal loophole". But on close inspection, the grandparent-birthplace criterion FIFA set is not a coding error. It is a deliberate choice: football migrates, and FIFA accepts that the descendants of those who left may still carry a lawful connection to the land of origin. Doubting the eligibility of Paes and Romeny conflates the right to represent with ethnic origin — two entirely different concepts.
The second, subtler legal dimension concerns Paes. This goalkeeper once wore the Netherlands U21 shirt. When a player has represented one federation at youth level, switching to represent another must pass through the "change of association" procedure. FIFA approved Paes in August 2026. This is the exact mechanism many fans do not know: it is permitted only once, and it is the real barrier for players with a youth-international past.
This complexity matters for one reason: it shows PSSI cleared not only domestic citizenship law but also FIFA's own administrative machinery. To do both, they had to persist for months, sometimes years. In the file, it is recorded that PSSI pursued the Paes case persistently and relentlessly. This was not an impulsive deal.
Economically, this is a strange market route. No transfer fee. No commission to any club. But there is another price — administrative cost, legal cost, political cost, and the cost of public attention. The transfer market is where people pay for the future but often forget the past. Here, they do not pay money; they buy back the past. What they buy is a grandfather's registered birthplace.
We might call it an "eligibility premium". It appears on no club's balance sheet, yet it exists: lawyers' hours, lobbying effort, trips, meetings, and the political credibility a federation must stake. In Paes's case, that premium also included convincing FIFA to change association for a player with a youth-international history. For a Southeast Asian federation, that is a procedural feat.
And here is the long-term point. This supply is finite. The "blijvers" community is a closed set formed during the colonial era and dissolved after independence. No further "blijver" generations are being born. Their descendants in the Netherlands age along demographic cycles. Every young player discovered and naturalised is one more withdrawal from the reserve. At some point — a decade, perhaps less — that supply runs dry. Then Indonesia must return to the academy, to youth development, to the path every other federation walks.
In the regional picture, Indonesia's move is a direct signal to Vietnam and Thailand. Vietnam, with a different colonial history and a much smaller diaspora playing professional football in Europe, has no comparable reserve to tap. While Indonesia is raising its national-team ceiling in the short term by importing finished players, Vietnam will most likely have to compete on other terms: cohesion, discipline, and a youth pipeline that has shown signs of stability for years.
Two models, two philosophies. One buys time, one builds time. And one cannot buy what one has never built, as experienced transfer hands like to say.
In media terms, the way Indonesian press covered this is rather distinctive. Instead of celebrating, they asked questions. The phrases "exceptional case" and "legal loophole" appeared. This shows an audit of legitimacy, not a ceremony of celebration. Kompas, one of Indonesia's most serious newspapers, was the main source of this wave of coverage. There, the question "are they really Indonesian" carries an implication Southeast Asian football knows well: the question of identity.
The problem is that identity in legal football is not the same as identity in emotional football. FIFA does not measure blood. Indonesian citizenship law does not require a percentage of indigenous ancestry. Both systems place their weight on connection — ancestral birthplace, family ties. A grandfather born in Semarang, in Jakarta, or in a small town on Java is enough to bring a grandchild into the national team, regardless of what that grandchild looks like.
In the industry, naturalised players are called "imports", but a distinction is needed: some imports disrupt identity, others complement an existing system. Indonesia's current case sits between the two ends. Paes and Romeny are not on the bench; they are expected to lead. For a federation that has never touched a World Cup place, that expectation is a grand promise — and also a debt.
There is one more detail the press rarely mentions: the single-nationality clause. To become an Indonesian citizen, a naturalised player usually has to renounce his original nationality. For Paes, that means giving up a Dutch passport. For a European player at peak career age, surrendering an EU passport is no small decision. It appears in no analytical table, yet it is part of the price both sides pay. When we talk about naturalisation, we often forget it is a life swap, not merely a shirt swap.
I learn more from the man at the end of the bench than from the one lifting the trophy. With naturalised players, I always ask the same question: what makes a person choose the shirt of a country he has never lived in? The answer may be money, may be the chance to play international football, may be a family thread rediscovered after years. No one has the right to judge that answer if the legal system has already permitted it.
But there is one thing the legal system does not grant: the recognition of the crowd. A fan in Jakarta may feel admiration for Paes after a 90th-minute save, and may also turn away when the team loses. Football is like that — it measures by emotional loyalty, not by clauses. Those of us who observe the game know that, in the long run, the stands always make the fairest court.
The popular framing — "two stars with no indigenous blood" — hides an uncomfortable truth for both sides. For the critics, calling this a "loophole" is a judgement with no legal basis: the grandparent-birthplace criterion was designed by FIFA, not exploited. Legal does not mean indigenous, and conflating the two turns a technical debate into an identity debate — where emotion always beats the facts.
For the cheerleaders, the story of "raising the team's strength" also deserves a question mark. No performance data accompanies it: no transfer fee, no index, no comparative result, no FIFA ranking points before and after. "Strength" is asserted, not measured. In reality, with a goalkeeper who once wore the Dutch youth shirt and a forward playing in Europe, Indonesia being stronger is a reasonable inference — but a reasonable inference is not data, and football history is full of teams that looked strong "on paper" yet melted on the pitch because they had no time to play together.
The blind spot of the story lies elsewhere. Naturalisation is a loan against domestic development. Every minute given to a naturalised player is a minute not given to a player developed at home. This is not morally wrong — a national team is not a welfare programme — but it creates a consequence federations often underestimate: after years, a generation of domestic players feels the pathway narrow, motivation drops, and academies lose good people as they redirect their aims. When the naturalisation supply runs dry, the national team realises it has left a development gap that cannot be filled in a single season.
That risk is also asymmetric. A successful naturalisation brings a modest short-term edge. A failed one — where documentation is questioned, where a player who once wore another nation's youth shirt is challenged — can leave a reputational scar that lasts. That is why those who build naturalisation files at any federation must work like auditors: leave no paper unchecked, verify three sources, and never issue a judgement after hearing only one side.
That is why, seen from Southeast Asia, Indonesia's move should be read as both a warning and a lesson. A warning because Vietnam is being pushed to answer. A lesson because every path has its limits.
People look at the scoreboard; I look at how they breathe when the ball drifts wide of the post. A player developed at the Hoang Anh Gia Lai or PVF academy, who has spent ten years training for a single call-up, will fight for the shirt with a different kind of drive — the kind that sits on no paper, that appears in no naturalisation file. Football is not only technical quality. It is also how a person breathes when the ball goes wide, how a team shrinks or rises in the 90th minute.
A country can import talent, but it cannot import memory. The memories in the stands — the grey heads at Gelora Bung Karno remembering a distant World Cup — are built by the very people born here, raised here, carrying their families' stories. Paes and Romeny will contribute important minutes to the national team. But the collective story of a football nation still has to be written by children growing up on its own pitches.
There is one more trend to watch. The Philippines and Malaysia tried this path before Indonesia, with varying degrees of success. If Indonesia succeeds in the 2026 qualifiers, the naturalisation wave will spread fast across Southeast Asia. At that point, FIFA may come under pressure to tighten the grandparent-birthplace criterion — a rule change that could reverse the whole advantage Indonesia is building. This is the kind of "rule-change" risk no club faces, but every federation on the naturalisation path must count.
And in the industry, a new class of people has appeared: those who search, analyse genealogies, and broker football naturalisations. They resemble historians standing behind transfers. Their work carries no visible transfer fee, yet it decides the fate of an entire national-team generation. This is a point the press has not explored, and perhaps the most fascinating part of the story.
For Indonesia, the next signal lies in two places: the speed with which a new naturalised player steps up, and whether they can go further in the World Cup qualifiers. If they succeed, this model will spread rapidly to other nations in the region, turning naturalisation into an arms race in Southeast Asian football, where the value of any single advantage fades for everyone.
For Vietnam, now is the time to ask a question that should not be avoided. If the academy is the slow but durable path, and naturalisation the fast but finite one, does the federation have the patience to take the long road while rivals take the shortcut? The best sportswriter is not the fastest runner, but the one who stays the longest. And perhaps football is the same.
